Insight
Differing from Copi, Black and others, Hacker sees Wittgenstein's Tractotus as a search for a pure logical language based in realism. This early position held that most philosophic problems were nonsense since they were the results of errors in logical form. According to Hacker, it was the influence of L. E. J. Brouwer that was decisive. After attending Brouwer's lectures on intuitionist mathematics, Wittgenstein abandoned his pristine positivism and began to develop a more expressive and social theoretical approach to language usage. While still holding that most philosophic problems were conceptual, he now argued that one could eliminate much philosophic misunderstanding by illuminating different aspects of ordinary linguistic behavior. In so doing, he held, one would be able to show that one projects varying conceptions on the world and these projections could be traced to differing forms of life. Wittgenstein's mature view then became a constructivist-criteria1 view of ordinary language.
On the argument concerning a private language, Hacker believes that Wittgenstein was right in rejecting perceptual introspection as valid evidence for the self. However, since Hacker himself maintains that self-knowledge is possible, he rejects Wittgenstein's non-cognitive thesis of avowals.
Asclearly and well as this book is written, it will be of little use to artists. art teachers and aestheticians. Even though his views of language changed, Wittgenstein was consistent in all of his writings in maintaining that the world consists of facts; values do not exist in the world. Hence he held a position of ethical noncognitivism and aesthetic ineffabilism. Art, he claimed, was unique and in the realm of the mystical. Nothing meaningful can be said of this realm. If nothing meaningful can be said, the only meaningful thing to do is to remain silent. who here approached the concept of time from the point of view of a particular discipline, but find themselves aware that such a topic has provoked much discussion over a wide range of disciplines. It is also a book that gives valuable historical perspective and background, and as this is the authors stated intention, he has succeeded in his prime task.
As a book of readings, it is comprehensive, beginning with the Judaeo-Christian and the Graeco-Roman heritage in Western culture. From there the sources become interdisciplinary in their perspective: from Leibniz to William James and from Piaget to Reichenbach. In its comprehensiveness, it will serve the task well of helping the various labourers in 'that same vineyard' appreciate the historical character of their concern. It will also aid students of the subject who are just beginning their researches, for it will provide them with a breadth of vision that otherwise only the most time-consuming reading and library hunting could achieve.
In the commentaries the author succinctly sketches themes rather than provides cumbersome line by line analyses. However, I would have preferred a deeper and longer first introductory Among its other virtues, this book stresses the importance of the concept time in understanding basic presuppositions in philosophy and historical writings. It emphasizes the antiquity of studies of the concept. As Sherover says: 'From the beginning, we have seen the identification of time with meaningful or intelligent activity and with functioning rationality. In the attempt t o comprehend the patterns of change and development-whether attributed to a transcendent divine or some kind of immanent source-time was seen as the frame for the reality of the encountered world and thereby, by implication, as a key to the comprehension of its meaning and significance.' Thereby he sums up the historical usage ofthe study of time, but, as he points out, there are quite substantial new perspectives being shaped, which shows that this study is by no means exhausted of its fascination and discovery.
